

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06006 01 OF 04 050531Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-03 H-01
CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 AID-05 IGA-02 MCE-00
ACDA-12 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EUR-12 SSM-03 /084 W
-----054014 050557Z /17

R 021611Z DEC 77
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5990
DIA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC//DSAA/ISA/NESA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE/ECJ7/4 & ECJ2

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 BEIRUT 6006

THIS IS A JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MAPS LE
SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF LEBANESE ARMED FORCES

SUMMARY:
LEBANESE ARMED FORCES CG VICTOR KHOURY HAS SPENT LAST EIGHT MONTHS ON BASIC PROBLEMS OF OBTAINING LOYAL OFFICER CORPS, REBUILDING INTEGRATED FORCES AND OBTAINING EQUIPMENT. HE HAS MADE PROGRESS WITH OFFICERS BY REVAMPING HIS HEADQUARTERS AND INSTITUTING PROFESSIONAL TRAINING PROGRAMS. HE HAS PUT TOGETHER TWO UNDERSTRENGTH BRIGADES ALONG WITH NUMEROUS ADDITIONAL SMALLER UNITS TO DEMONSTRATE A PRESENCE UNTIL HE CAN REBUILD ADDITIONAL UNITS. EQUIPMENT IS BEING OBTAINED BY VARIOUS MEANS TO PUT THE ARMED FORCES BACK IN OPERATION AS A MILITARY FORCE. THE FORCES ARE RECLAIMING SOME OF THE EQUIPMENT LOST OR DAMAGED DURING THE WAR, BUT BULK OF EQUIPMENT WILL HAVE TO BE PURCHASED.

THE FORCES' FUTURE PLANS CALL FOR REBUILDING TWO MORE REGIONAL BRIGADES WHILE CONTINUING TO IMPROVE COMBAT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06006 01 OF 04 050531Z

CAPABILITY OF TWO BRIGADES FORMED DURING 1977. CG KHOURY NOT PLANNING TO ASK FOR NEW U.S. ARMS CREDIT UNTIL HE DEMONSTRATES EFFECTIVE USE OF FY 77 CREDIT. POTENTIAL FY 78 SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS SIMILAR IN CONCEPT TO FY 77 PROGRAM. THE LEBANESE BUDGET HAS AUTHORIZED 490 MILLION LL, (\$160 MILLION) FOR LEBANESE ARMED FORCES. THE AIR FORCE MAY LOSE MIRAGES AND ADD HELICOPTERS BUT ESSENTIALLY WILL

REMAIN SAME. THE NAVY HAS DEFINED MISSION CLOSER TO MILITARY SUPPORT THAN PREVIOUS ANTI-SMUGGLER OPERATIONS AND PLANS FOR ADDITIONAL VESSEL.

1. LAF PROGRESS TO DATE. BRIG VICTOR KHOURY WAS PLACED IN CHARGE OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES IN MARCH 1977 WITH THE TASK OF REBUILDING A SPLINTERED AND DEMORALIZED ARMY WHICH IN HIS WORDS COULDN'T EVEN RETREAT CORRECTLY. DURING THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS HE HAS QUIETLY BUT INDUSTRIOUSLY WORKED WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF REGAINING THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEBANESE SECURITY, VISIBLY SHOWING THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS AUTHORITY TO THE COUNTRY AND DEMONSTRATING THE ABILITY OF CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS TO WORK TOGETHER FOR THE NATIONAL GOOD. HE HAS MADE STEADY, SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS, BUT STILL DOES NOT HAVE A TOTALLY LOYAL, COHESIVE, RELIGIOUSLY INTEGRATED FORCE.

THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THE MYRIAD OF PROBLEMS HE HAS BEEN FACED WITH LIE IN THE AREAS OF ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE AND LOYAL OFFICER CORPS, REBUILDING THE BASIC TROOP STRUCTURE AND FORMING AN INTEGRATED ARMED FORCE WHILE REEQUIPPING THIS FORCE FROM AN INEFFICIENT LOGISTIC BASE. UNDER THE PRESSURE, DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS, OF PREPARING TO DEPLOY UNITS TO SOUTH LEBANON, THE REBUILDING PROCESS HAS BEEN GAINING MOMENTUM: THE CG AND HIS STAFF HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING TROOP AND BARRACKS READINESS INSPECTIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06006 01 OF 04 050531Z

THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY; THERE HAVE BEEN TANK, INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY LIVE FIRING EXERCISES; THERE HAVE BEEN DAILY TRAINING FLIGHTS OF THE LEBANESE AIR FORCE AND WE DETECT AN INCREASED SENSE OF PURPOSE AND MISSION. SINCE HE WAS APPOINTED, KHOURY HAS BEEN SIMULTANEOUSLY ATTACKING THE THREE MAIN PROBLEMS OF (A) OFFICERS, (B) INTEGRATED FORCES AND (C) EQUIPMENT, WITH PATIENT STEPS AND IN MOST CASES, MODERATE SUCCESS.

A. ESTABLISHING A LOYAL OFFICER CORPS.

1) THE REVAMPED LAF HQ STAFF. KHOURY BEGAN HIS OFFICER PROGRAMS BY MOULDING HIS HEADQUARTERS STAFF AT YARZE INTO A MODEL FOR THE REST OF THE ARMY. HE HAS SELECTED HIS STAFF SO THAT IT IS RELIGIOUSLY INTEGRATED, COMPETENT, GENERALLY MUCH YOUNGER THAN PREVIOUSLY, AND LOYAL. HE IS GENERALLY NOT AS WORRIED BY WHICH SIDE AN OFFICER WAS ON DURING THE WAR AS HE IS CONCERNED WITH HIS COMBAT RECORD AND INTEGRITY. HE HAS BEEN NIBBLING AWAY AT INSTITUTIONALIZED INCOMPETENCE AND RELIGIOUS INTRANSIGENCE BY WHOLESALE TRANSFERS AND REASSIGNMENTS. POLITICAL OPPOSITION SEEMS TO BE SUBSIDING. HE RECENTLY

FIRE SOME OLD HARD CORE MARONITES AND REPLACED THEM WITH YOUNGER MODERATE MARONITES, AND IT HARDLY RAISED AN EYEBROW FROM THE LEBANESE FRONT. HIS PERSONAL DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ARCHAIC, INEFFICIENT AND OFTEN CORRUPT HQ STAFF HAS SPURRED HIM TO UNDERTAKE A MASSIVE REORGANIZATION OF HIS HQ STAFF BASED ON THE CANADIAN AND JORDANIAN STAFFS. THE EFFECTS OF HIS HQ POLICY OF INSTALLING LOYAL, COMPETENT OFFICERS ARE BEGINNING TO BE FELT DOWN TO THE MILITARY REGIONAL COMMANDS, WHERE A CADRE OF HIS HAND-PICKED OFFICERS ARE GENERALLY PERFORMING WELL.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06006 02 OF 04 050552Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-03 H-01
CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 AID-05 IGA-02 MCE-00
ACDA-12 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EUR-12 SSM-03 /084 W
-----054068 050557Z /17

R 021611Z DEC 77
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5991
DIA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC//DSAA/ISA/NESA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE/ECJ7/4 & ECJ2

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 BEIRUT 6006

2) OFFICER TRAINING. KHOURY SAW IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAKING OVER AS CG THAT PROFESSIONAL OFFICER TRAINING IN WESTERN COUNTRIES WOULD BE A PRIME VEHICLE FOR BUILDING A LOYAL STAFF AND ENSURING A CONTINUAL PIPELINE OF IMPARTIALLY TRAINED OFFICERS. IN FY 78, AS BEFORE THE WAR, FRANCE AND THE US WILL PROVIDE THE BULK OF PROFESSIONAL OFFICER TRAINING WITH SOME ADDITIONAL TRAINING PROVIDED BY BELGIUM, JORDAN AND SYRIA. INTERNALLY, OTHER OFFICER TRAINING WILL BE PROVIDED, SUCH AS THE OFFICER ACADEMY WHICH WILL SOON BEGIN ITS FIRST POST WAR CADET COURSE, AND THE 16 WEEK BN CMDR'S COURSE (SCHOOL FOR SUPERIOR MILITARY STUDIES) WHICH NOW HAS 24 OFFICERS ENROLLED.

TRAINING OF ENLISTED MEN HAS ALSO HAD ITS EFFECT ON THE STAFF OFFICERS REQUIRED TO MANAGE AND TRAIN THE MEN. THE SPECIAL INTEGRATED COMMANDO BN'S BEING TRAINED AT YARZE AS WELL AS THE NEW RECRUITS AT FIYYADIYAH CHALLENGE THE LEADERSHIP, FAIRNESS AND ABILITY OF THE INSTRUCTORS TO

REBUILD THE ARMY. BOTH THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING INTENSIVE TRAINING. THE AIR FORCE HAS BEEN RAPIDLY TRYING TO REQUALIFY ITS PREVIOUSLY DORMANT PILOT CORPS THROUGH DAILY JET FLIGHT TRAINING AND THE SMALL NAVY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06006 02 OF 04 050552Z

IS IN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS.

3) PURGING UNDESIRABLES. LAST JUNE'S POSTPONEMENT OF THE DECISION ON ARMY RETIREMENTS FOR SIX MONTHS MEANS THE GOVERNMENT STILL HAS THE POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS PROBLEM OF MASS RESIGNATIONS LOOMING IN DECEMBER 1977. MOST MILITARY OBSERVERS EXPECT THE RESIGNATION ISSUE TO BE SOLVED QUIETLY. MANY OF THE RESIGNING OFFICERS HAVE ALREADY LEFT THE ARMY AND ARE WAITING AT HOME OR AT THEIR PLACE OF NEW EMPLOYMENT FOR THE FINAL WORD. HOWEVER, THERE ARE STILL SOME DELICATE INDIVIDUAL CASES AMONG THE POTENTIAL RETIREES AND ANY PERCEIVED RELIGIOUS OR POLITICAL DISCRIMINATIONS WOULD BRING VARIOUS CONFESSIONAL LEADERS ANGRILY OUT OF THEIR CHAIRS.

LONG OVERDUE PROMOTIONS MAY BE A MORE IMPORTANT FUTURE ISSUE FOR THE ENTIRE ARMY. SOME OFFICERS WILL BE PASSED OVER AND, IF THE VARIOUS POLITICAL LEADERS DECIDE TO TAKE ISSUE, THERE COULD BE A REPEAT OF LAST JUNE'S RELIGIOUSLY ORIENTED RESIGNATION SQUABBLE. THIS PROBLEM HAS ALREADY SURFACED WITH POSTWAR PROMOTION OF ENLISTED MEN.

ANOTHER PROBLEM FACING THE ARMY IS LOW WAGES AGAINST THE SKYROCKETING COST OF LIVING. NEARLY EVERY OFFICER IS COMPLAINING ABOUT INADEQUATE WAGES. FOR EXAMPLE, A CAPTAIN MAKES APPROXIMATELY 800 LL A MONTH, BUT POOR APARTMENTS IN BEIRUT RENT FOR AT LEAST 1000 LL MONTHLY. EVEN A HEALTHY RAISE (WHICH IS UNLIKELY) WOULD BE INADEQUATE AND OFFICERS ARE UNDER HEAVY FAMILY PRESSURE TO RESIGN AND ENTER FAMILY ENTERPRISES. THIS MAY CAUSE THE DEPARTURE OF MANY ADDITIONAL OFFICERS, UNFORTUNATELY THE MOST TECHNICALLY COMPETENT.

THE LAST AND MOST DIFFICULT OFFICER PROBLEM IS THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06006 02 OF 04 050552Z

FUTURE OF EXTREMISTS SUCH AS THOSE CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS FIGHTING IN SOUTH LEBANON. ARMY POLICY ON THIS IS TYPICALLY LEBANESE: NO ONE WILL BE PUNISHED BUT NO ONE WILL BE ALLOWED TO STAY ON ACTIVE DUTY. THE SOLUTION WILL BE TO PUT THESE OFFICERS IN A NON-COMBATANT LIMBO AT THE DISPOSITION OF THE

GENERAL UNTIL THEY DECIDE TO RESIGN VOLUNTARILY OR
LEAVE THE COUNTRY.

B. FORMING AN INTEGRATED FORCE.

1) RETURNING TO THE FOLD. PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE
IN DEVELOPING AND TRAINING A RELIGIOUSLY INTEGRATED FORCE.
LITTLE IS LEFT OF THE FOUR MAIN WARTIME ELEMENTS OF
THE ARMY: THE LEBANESE ARAB ARMY HAS GENERALLY BEEN
NEUTRALIZED, THE VANGUARDS HAVE BEEN FULLY ABSORBED INTO
THE BEQAA'S 1ST BRIGADE, YARZE HAS BECOME THE INTEGRATED
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ENTIRE ARMY AND FOR THE MOST PART THE
STAY-AT-HOMES HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR BARRACKS. ALMOST
EVERY CASERNE (EXCLUDING SOUTH LEBANON) HAS BEEN RETURNED
TO ARMY CONTROL AND IS UNDER REPAIR. EVEN THOUGH IT IS STILL
DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS TO SEND MUSLIM SOLDIERS TO THE
CHRISTIAN AREAS OR TO SEND CHRISTIAN SOLDIERS TO MUSLIM
LOCATIONS, THERE ARE INTEGRATED UNITS AT YARZE, FIYYADIYAH,
THE BEQAA, HAMMANA AND IN SIDON.

THE AIR FORCE IS INTEGRATED AND THE NAVY IS READY TO
INTEGRATE WHEN IT REOPENS ITS BASES IN PREDOMINATELY MUSLIM
TRIPOLI AND TYRE. THE CG DOES NOT HAVE ANY SERIOUS PROBLEM
WITH LACK OF MUSLIM CONFIDENCE IN HIS REBUILDING
PROGRAMS. CONVERSATIONS WITH MUSLIM MILITARY HAVE SHOWN
THAT THEY GENERALLY FEEL THEY ARE MOST RELIABLE TROOPS KHOURY
HAD AND THEY ARE CONFIDENT HE RESPECTS THEM. MUSLIMS DOUBT
THE SINCERITY OF NON-INTEGRATED CHRISTIAN TROOPS, SUCH AS
IN SARBA BARRACKS. KHOURY HIMSELF HAS LONG TIME AFFECTION
FOR AND UNDERSTANDING OF PROFESSIONAL QUALITIES OF
LEBANESE MUSLIM SOLDIERS. HE FEELS CHRISTIAN ARMY ELEMENTS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BEIRUT 06006 02 OF 04 050552Z

MAY BE TOO AFFECTED BY THE POLITICAL CONCERNS FOR CHRISTIAN
COMMUNITY FUTURE SECURITY AS VOICED BY THE LEBANESE FRONT.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06006 03 OF 04 050543Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-03 H-01

CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 AID-05 IGA-02 MCE-00
ACDA-12 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EUR-12 SSM-03 /084 W
-----054028 050557Z /17

R 021611Z DEC 77
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5992
DIA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC//DSAA/ISA/NESA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE/ECJ7/4 & ECJ2

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 BEIRUT 6006

HOWEVER, THE MAJORITY OF CHRISTIAN OFFICERS AND MEN WILLINGLY TAKE ORDERS AND ARE GENERALLY RESPONSIVE TO KHOURY, WHO HAS BEEN PAINSTAKINGLY WEANING THEM AWAY FROM THEIR APPREHENSION AND CREATING UNITS RESPONSIVE TO THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY. THIS HAS NOT BEEN AN EASY TASK AND THESE FORCES WILL REMAIN SUSPECT IN KHOURY'S MIND UNTIL THEY CONVINCE HIM OF THEIR LOYALTY AND DEDICATION.

2) BUILDING UP ARMY FORCE LEVEL. TROOPS NOW UNDER CG KHOURY'S CONTROL ARE ESTIMATED AT 7300. A BREAKDOWN OF THESE FORCES BY REGION INCLUDE BEIRUT - 800 MUSLIMS; MT LEBANON - 2300 CHRISTIANS, 200 MIXED IN YARZE AND 200 DRUZE IN HAMMANA; NORTH - 500 MUSLIMS; BEQAA - 1500 MIXED; SOUTH - 600 MIXED; AIR FORCE - 500 MIXED; NAVY - 150 CHRISTIANS AND 550 MIXED RECRUITS. THE RATE OF RETURN OF FORMER SOLDIERS IS HANDICAPPED BY DAMAGED BARRACKS, FEAR OF POLITICAL RETALIATION, LACK OF EQUIPMENT, THE REQUIREMENT FOR INITIAL DETAILED SUPERVISION AND THE LACK OF INCENTIVE BECAUSE THEY CONTINUE TO BE PAID WHETHER THEY RETURN OR NOT. NONE OF THE FACILITIES ARE IN GOOD SHAPE AND THERE IS SERIOUS SHORTAGE OF ALL TYPES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. ONE BATTALION COMMANDER TOLD DATT IT WAS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06006 03 OF 04 050543Z

IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO EFFECTIVELY ABSORB MORE THAN 50 FORMER SOLDIERS PER MONTH BECAUSE OF SHORTAGE OF NCO'S, NEED TO INCULCATE DISCIPLINE AFTER TWO YEARS FREEDOM, AND THE SHEER ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN OF REINSTITUTING CARE FOR THE SOLDIERS AND FAMILIES.

C. REEQUIPPING THE LAF.

1) THE OVERALL PLAN FOR EQUIPPING THE LAF IS BEGINNING TO TAKE SHAPE. NEW MILITARY CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS, DELIVERY OF EQUIPMENT PURCHASED PRIOR TO 1976, REHABILITATING PRE-WAR EQUIPMENT, AND NEW CASH PURCHASES ARE THE MAIN MEANS OF OBTAINING SUPPORT. THE US HAS PROVIDED \$25 MILLION IN FY 77 AND THE LEBANESE ARE MAKING FULL USE OF THESE FUNDS

IN AN IMPACT PROGRAM TO OBTAIN URGENTLY NEEDED LIGHT ARMS AND EQUIPMENT. THE GOL IS NOT PRESENTLY IN RECEIPT OF NEW CREDIT FROM ANY OTHER COUNTRIES, BUT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT SOME MAY BE PROVIDED FROM FRANCE. DURING 1976, DELIVERY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT PURCHASED IN THE US, FRANCE, UK AND FRG WAS FROZEN, BUT NOW THAT LAF APPEARS TO HAVE A REASONABLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS, DELIVERY OF VARIOUS PRE-WAR PURCHASES ARE RESUMING. (THE US IS RESUMING WITH RADIOS AND VEHICLES, FRANCE WITH AIRCRAFT AND SPARE PARTS, AND THE UK WITH AIRCRAFT, AVIATION SPARES, AND NAVAL GUNS.)

REHABILITATION OF EQUIPMENT IS PROCEEDING SLOWLY, BUT DEFINITE PROGRESS IS BEING MADE. THE REHABILITATION OF NAVAL LANDING CRAFT, TRACKED VEHICLES, AT MISSILE LAUNCHERS, TRUCKS AND ARTILLERY ARE ALL LEBANESE CRASH PROJECTS LIMITED ONLY BY AVAILABILITY OF PARTS AND REPAIR TECHNICIANS. EXACT NUMBERS OF RECLAIMED EQUIPMENT IS DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN, BUT LAF NOW HAVE IN HAND APPROXIMATELY 30 TANKS, 38 ARMORED SCOUT CARS (AML
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06006 03 OF 04 050543Z

AND SALADIN), AND 19 M113 APC'S IN VARIOUS STAGES OF OPERATION. THE ARTY SITUATION IS MUCH WORSE AND LAF MAY BE COMPELLED TO SHOPAROUND FOR NEW ARTILLERY TO REPLACE THE COMPLETELY WORN OUT EQUIPMENT. NEW CASH PURCHASES ARE CONSIDERED TO BE NECESSARY MAINLY IN THE AREAS OF ARTILLERY, PREFABRICATED TROOP SHELTERS, RADIOS, VEHICLES AND RIFLES.

2. LAF PLANS FOR FUTURE. IN THE FUTURE KHOURY INTENDS TO KEEP THE MOMENTUM ROLLING AND REBUILD TWO ADDITIONAL ARMY BRIGADES WHILE ACCOMPLISHING SOME CHANGES IN THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE.

A. THE ARMY. SIX MONTHS AGO LEBANESE MILITARY PLANNING CALLED FOR AN INITIAL FORCE OF TWO BRIGADES OF THREE BATTALIONS EACH BY NOVEMBER 1977. TWO WEAK BRIGADES HAVE BEEN FORMED, ONE IN THE BEQAA REGION (1500 MEN IN 2 INFANTRY BATTALIONS, TANK BATTALION, ARTY BATTALION, LOGISTICS BATTALION, SIGNAL COMPANY AND ENGINEER COMPANY), AND THE OTHER IN THE MT LEBANON REGION (2300 MEN IN 3 INFANTRY BATTALIONS, TANK COMPANY, ARTY BATTERY, MP COMPANY AND LOGISTICS COMPANY). THESE FORCES ARE GENERALLY ESTIMATED TO HAVE ONLY 30PCT. OF THEIR REQUIRED EQUIPMENT. WORK WILL CONTINUE ON REBUILDING THESE BRIGADES AS MORE TROOPS RETURN OR ARE RECRUITED AND EQUIPMENT IS PROVIDED. BECAUSE OF A LACK OF MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER, THEY ARE ONLY CAPABLE OF LIMITED MISSIONS AT PRESENT.

THE BEQAA BRIGADE WILL BE USED AS THE MAIN BODY WHEN

THE ARMY DEPLOYS TO THE SOUTH. THE MT LEBANON FORCE IS ALL CHRISTIAN AND WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MATN AND KASRAWAN AREAS. TWO NEW BRIGADES TO BE FORMED IN 1978 ARE TO BE STATIONED IN RELATIVELY NEW AREA CENTERED ON THE YARZE HQ.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06006 04 OF 04 050539Z
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-03 H-01

CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 AID-05 IGA-02 MCE-00

ACDA-12 OMB-01 TRSE-00 EUR-12 SSM-03 /084 W

-----054027 050558Z /17

R 021611Z DEC 77

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5993

DIA WASHDC

SECDEF WASHDC//DSAA/ISA/NESA

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE/ECJ7/4 & ECJ2

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 BEIRUT 6006

KHOURY UNDERSTANDS THE INHERENT PROBLEMS BUILT INTO THE OLD REGIONAL SYSTEM WHERE THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS OF TRADITIONAL CASERNES ASSURED THAT THE ARMY WOULD RETAIN ITS RELIGIOUS SEPARATION. HE INTENDS TO OVERCOME THIS SITUATION BY RELOCATING SOME UNITS. ONE NEW INTEGRATED BRIGADE WILL BE PLACED IN YARZE AND HAMMANA AFTER REPAIRING AND ENLARGING THE OLD DRUZE BARRACKS IN HAMMANA AND BUILDING A NEW CAMP WITH PREFABRICATED BUILDINGS IN THE YARZE COMMANDO TRAINING AREA. THE SECOND BRIGADE WILL INITIALLY BE MOSTLY DRUZE AND MUSLIM AND BASED IN THE HENRI CHEHAB BARRACKS IN EAST BEIRUT. THE BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR THESE TWO NEW BRIGADES EXISTS, BUT THE YARZE HQ MUST APPOINT BRIGADE STAFFS, PREPARE BARRACKS AND EQUIPMENT WHILE RECALLING TROOPS AND ADDING NEW RECRUITS. THESE TASKS WOULD BE PROBLEMS BY THEMSELVES, BUT WHEN CONSIDERED ALONG WITH THE TASK OF COMPLETING THE EXISTING FORCES, THE BRIGADES TO BE FORMED DURING THE COMING YEAR WILL MOST LIKELY CONTINUE TO BE UNDERSTRENGTH, UNDEREQUIPPED, AND AS STATED BY KHOURY, THEY WILL HAVE TO BE USED AS A REPLENISHMENT BASE FOR THE FORCES DEPLOYED TO THE SOUTH.

B. RELIEF OF ADF. PLANS ARE TO INITIALLY RELIEVE THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06006 04 OF 04 050539Z

ADF OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AREAS OUTSIDE BEIRUT AND THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS. THESE LAF FORCES WILL BE CONTROLLED BY THE YARZE HA AND INITIALLY MOVE OUT FROM YARZE TO TAKE UP ADF POSITIONS IN ALEY, MATN, KASRAWAN AND THE SHUF. THE LAF CMDR FEELS THAT THEY CAN INCREMENTALLY TAKE OVER MOST ADF AREAS NEXT YEAR BUT THAT THE SYRIANS WILL REMAIN IN AKKAR AND BEQAA SOMEWHAT LONGER.

C. NEW CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS. BRIG KHOURY TOLD DATT HE DID NOT PLAN TO ASK FOR ADDITIONAL US CREDIT UNTIL HE HAD PROVEN TO US THAT HE HAD MADE GOOD USE OF \$25 MILLION. THIS DOES NOT DETER HIS STAFF FROM PLANNING FOR THEIR REQUIREMENTS, WHICH WILL ENTAIL BASICALLY THE SAME TYPES OF MATERIAL AS WAS PROCURED WITH THE FY 77 CREDIT EXCEPT THAT IT WILL BE IN GREATER QUANTITIES BECAUSE UNIT FORCE LEVELS WILL BE INCREASED. THE FY 78 REQUEST MAY ALSO INCLUDE SOME ARTILLERY. THE BULK OF EQUIPMENT WILL BE PURCHASED ON CREDIT FROM THE US AND FRANCE (THE US GENERALLY PROVIDING LIGHT ARMS AND EQUIPMENT AND THE FRENCH HEAVY ARMS AND AIR-CRAFT). COMMERCIAL CASH PURCHASES WILL PROBABLY ALSO BE MADE FROM ENGLAND, FRG AND BELGIUM.

D. LEBANESE MILITARY BUDGET. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ACCOUNTS FOR 24PCT. OF THE 1978 GOL BUDGET. OF THE MILITARY'S 490 MILLION LL (\$160 MILLION) ALLOCATION, 276 MILLION IS FOR PERSONNEL COSTS, 201 MILLION IS EQUIPMENT AND MAINTENANCE RELATED AND 12 MILLION FOR SPECIAL PROJECTS.

E. THE AIR FORCE. BRIG KHOURY SUPPORTS A REQUIREMENT FOR FOUGA MAGISTER TRAINERS; A GROUND ATTACK CAPABILITY BUILT AROUND THE STURDY OLD HAWKER HUNTERS; AND ASSAULT HELICOPTERS. THIS CONCEPT DELETES THE REQUIREMENT FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 06006 04 OF 04 050539Z

MIRAGE FIGHTERS. THIS DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IS CAUSING SOME PROBLEMS AMONG THE YOUNG FIGHTER PILOTS WHO LOOK DOWN ON ATTACK AND HELO PILOTS, BUT KHOURY'S CONCEPT SHOULD PREVAIL. A LIKELY INCREASE IN HELICOPTERS (THEY NOW HAVE 6 BELL 212'S, 13 ALOUETTE II'S AND TWO ALOUETTE III'S) MAY BE OFFSET BY DISPOSAL OF THE TEN MIRAGES. THE LEBANESE AIR FORCE IS CONSIDERED WELL OFF IN AIRCRAFT, FUEL RESERVES, ORDNANCE AND FACILITIES.

F. THE NAVY. THE NAVY FORESEES ITS FUTURE MISSION AS

SUPPORTING THE ARMY THROUGH NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT,
AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS AND MINESWEEPING RATHER THAN ANTI-
SMUGGLER OPERATIONS WHICH NOW ARE PERFORMED BY POLICE. THE
NAVY'S SMALL PATROL CRAFT, THOUGH EXCELLENTLY MAINTAINED,
ARE INADEQUATE FOR THE NEW TASKS AND THERE WILL
LIKELY BE FUTURE INTEREST IN PURCHASING AT LEAST ONE
LARGER CORVETTE TYPE VESSEL (SEE IIR 6 857 0117 77 FOR
DETAILS OF FUTURE NAVY PROGRAM).
PARKER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMED FORCES, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 02-Dec-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977BEIRUT06006
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770450-0152
Format: TEL
From: BEIRUT
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197712102/aaaadiko.tel
Line Count: 503
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 11e0cefb-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION PM
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 08-Apr-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 107736
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ASSESSMENT OF LEBANESE ARMED FORCES SUMMARY: LEBANESE ARMED FORCES CG VICTOR KHOURY HAS SPENT L
TAGS: MOPS, LE
To: STATE DIA
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/11e0cefb-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009